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There is a point where methods devour themselves. I would like to start there.
– Frantz Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks
 
What is the meaning of  critique for critical phenomenology? Building on Gayle Salamon’s 
engagement with this question in the inaugural issue of  Puncta: A Journal for Critical 
Phenomenology (2018), I will propose a six-fold account of  critique as: 1) the art of  asking 
questions, moved by crisis; 2) a transcendental inquiry into the conditions of  possibility for 
meaningful experience; 3) a quasi-transcendental, historically-grounded study of  particular 
lifeworlds; 4) a (situated and interested) analysis of  power; 5) the problematization of  basic 
concepts and methods; and 6) a praxis of  freedom that seeks not only to interpret the 
meaning of  lived experience, but also to change the conditions under which horizons of  
possibility for meaning, action, and relationship are wrongfully limited or foreclosed.1 While 
the first two dimensions of  critique are alive and well in classical phenomenology, the others 
help to articulate what is distinctive about critical phenomenology.2  
1 Thanks to Thomas Abrams and Team Phenomenology (a reading group based at UCLA and the 
University of  Virginia) for conversations that helped me to formulate these six senses of  critique. This 
paper is also inspired by conversations at the Collegium Phaenomenologicum on Critical Phenomenology 
organized by Anne O’Byrne in July 2019, and by discussions in my graduate seminars on Critical 
Phenomenology at Vanderbilt (2017) and Queen’s (2019). In particular, I would like to thank Mérédith 
Laferté-Coutu, Adam Schipper, Shiloh Whitney, and Noah Moss Brender for their input and feedback. 
Thanks also to the anonymous reviewers who raised many important issues and questions that I have 
barely touched upon here, but which I intend to take up in future writing.
2 “Classical phenomenology” is an admittedly imperfect term. I don’t think anyone would say of  
themselves, “I do classical phenomenology,” nor would it be particularly helpful to draw up a list of  
classical and critical phenomenologists, as if  these were two different schools of  thought. And yet, I 
do think there is a significant difference between a practice of  phenomenology that explicitly engages 
in social critique—let’s call this critical phenomenology—and a practice of  phenomenology that does 
not. I have opted to call the latter classical phenomenology, not to suggest that such an approach is 
uncritical—as I will argue, there are multiple senses of  critique at work in both classical and critical 
phenomenology—but rather to reflect in an open-ended way on the senses of  critique that I see operative 
both in the emerging sub-field of  critical phenomenology and in work throughout the phenomenological 
tradition that engages in some form of  social critique.
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As an initial formulation, we could understand critical phenomenology as a practice 
of  suspending hegemonic “common sense” accounts of  reality in order to reflect on the 
conditions of  lived experience and the lifeworld in which it unfolds. It then describes, 
interrogates, and ultimately transforms the contingent, historical, yet quasi-transcendental 
structures that shape the meaning and materiality of  this experience. I will say more about 
quasi-transcendental structures below, but some examples include colonialism, anti-Black 
racism, and heteropatriarchy. These structures are contingent in the sense that they have 
emerged through historical struggles, the outcome of  which could have been—and could 
still become—otherwise. But they function in a quasi-transcendental way insofar as they 
generate and consolidate meaning by normalizing some habits of  perception, cognition, 
and comportment while pathologizing others. In other words, they are not just phenomena 
in the world, but also (inter)subjective ways of  seeing, hearing, moving, relating, and sense-
making.3
The main difference between classical and critical phenomenology turns on a 
methodological and ethical commitment to attend to the ways that power and history shape 
lived experience. As Salamon (2018) puts it, “if  phenomenology offers us unparalleled 
means to describe what we see with utmost precision, to illuminate what is true, critique 
insists that we also attend to the power that is always conditioning that truth” (15). The 
critical suspension of  hegemonic norms is akin to the epochē in classical phenomenology, 
which brackets or suspends the natural attitude. But the challenge of  bracketing quasi-
transcendental assumptions like white supremacy or heteropatriarchy is different from 
the challenge of  bracketing more abstract ontological and epistemic norms, such as the 
assumption that a perceptual object like a table exists apart from me, prior to the noetic 
acts that constitute its meaning. This difference is not just a matter of  relative abstraction or 
concreteness; it has both methodological and substantive theoretical implications. First, it is 
by no means clear that we can simply “bracket” white supremacy or “put it out of  play” in 
order to reflect on the way it shapes our lived experience and our lifeworld. As long as the 
historical, material, social world is structured by white supremacy, consciousness—including 
its perceptual practices, its ways of  remembering and imagining, its encounters with alterity 
and feelings of  empathy (or lack thereof), its kinaesthetic experiences, embodied habits, 
and ways of  moving through the world—remains immersed in the very structures that one 
3 A full account of  the quasi-transcendental is beyond the scope of  this paper, but my use of  this term 
is closer to Sartre’s (2004) practico-inert—understood as a structure that is contingently established 
through praxis, but then comes to function as a generative matrix for further praxis—than it is to 
Derrida’s account of  the quasi-transcendental as a condition of  possibility that is, at the same time, a 
condition of  impossibility. Sina Kramer (2014) defines Derrida’s quasi-transcendental as “the moment 
in which the entirety of  the system falters, which is nevertheless necessary to its very operation” (522). 
This logic of  “constitutive exclusion” is internal to the structures I have named as examples of  the quasi-
transcendental; for example, heteropatriarchy depends for its coherence on the constitutive exclusion of  
a queer/femme Other, who in turn haunts the system as a trace that can never be fully expunged. This 
is a helpful concept for critical phenomenology, but my own use of  the term quasi-transcendental in this 
paper could be understood more simply as a condition for possibility that is contingently established—
that could have been otherwise—but which comes to function as if it were necessary and inevitable. In 
this sense, it is very close to the concept of  the historical a priori discussed below. 
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attempts to suspend, both to describe how they work and to interrogate them, ultimately 
intervening to transform or abolish oppressive structures. 
Phenomenologists such as Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) raised the possibility that 
even the classical epochē and reduction was a process that could never be completed once 
and for all (xii-xvi). Yet, the stakes of  bracketing the assumption that the world exists apart 
from consciousness (in classical phenomenology) and bracketing the complex matrix of  
assumptions built into white supremacy, including its intersections with colonialism, 
capitalism, heteropatriarchy, and ableism (in critical phenomenology), are different in 
scale and complexity. Whether they are different enough to warrant regarding critical 
phenomenology as post-phenomenological hinges on one’s understanding of  structures 
like white supremacy as quasi-transcendental, and therefore generative of  meaning rather 
than simply phenomena in the world to be studied empirically. Furthermore, the challenge 
of  bracketing white supremacy, even just methodologically in order to “think what we are 
doing” (Arendt 1958, 5), will be different depending on how one is situated in relation to 
this structure. A white person who benefits materially from white supremacy will have to 
undertake a different kind of  work to describe, map, and critically interrogate it than a 
person of  color whose life chances are systematically attacked or undermined by white 
supremacy. To put this in more explicitly phenomenological terms: the way into the epochē 
will be different depending on how one is situated in the lifeworld.
The second important methodological difference between classical and critical 
phenomenology concerns the relation between description, normativity, and action. In 
classical phenomenology, the point of  the transcendental reduction is to discover and 
systematize a priori conditions for the possibility of  a meaningful experience, such as the 
correlation between noesis and noema. The possibility of  questioning the normative status 
of  these correlations or intervening to change them does not arise because it simply 
does not make sense to change a priori structures. It would be as strange to question the 
ethical or political status of  the Kantian categories; they are not right or wrong, they just 
are. But one cannot adequately describe and map the quasi-transcendental structure of  
white supremacy without engaging in a normative critique of  its impact on the world, 
embodied consciousness, and Being-with Others or Being-for Others. And once one begins 
to interrogate the ethical and political dimensions of  white supremacy, it is not enough 
merely to describe it and denounce it as harmful or unjust; critique calls for collective action 
to transform structures that normalize, naturalize, and support the possibilities of  some 
subjects while pathologizing, marginalizing, and undermining the possibilities of  others. 
While not every attempt at critical phenomenology will manage to intervene and transform 
the structures that it describes and interrogates, an ethical orientation towards practices 
of  freedom is crucial to the method, and not simply added on later as an “application” of  
philosophical analysis to the “real” world. 
Again, classical phenomenology would not think of  intervening into the transcendental 
structures of  consciousness or even the lifeworld, even when Husserl (1970) announces a 
crisis in the European sciences. The point is not to transform the structures of  the lifeworld, 
but rather to make the empirical sciences more accountable to the lifeworld, and to guide 
them back to a transcendental foundation in phenomenology. Critical phenomenology has 
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different aspirations, and so it needs different methods. We must both rethink the purpose 
and practice of  methods, such as the transcendental and eidetic reductions, and also engage 
with non-phenomenological critical methods to trace the contingent, historical emergence 
of  structures like white supremacy and heteropatriarchy, to ask whether and how these 
structures could be otherwise, to experiment with different modes of  transformative praxis 
to (re)open horizons of  possibility, and to reclaim, create, and support more liberatory ways 
of  being, relating, and sense-making. 
It follows from these first two points that critical phenomenology is a hybrid method; 
it needs tools, concepts, and practices beyond classical phenomenology to engage with 
history and power in its specificity, whether these methods come from postcolonial theory, 
feminism, critical race theory, Marxism, the Frankfurt school, psychoanalysis, queer theory, 
Foucaultian genealogy, deconstruction, critical disability studies, or some other critical 
discourse. As such, critical phenomenology is not a science and does not aspire to become 
one; it a pluralistic and open-ended practice, a way of  thinking, doing, and paying attention 
that seeks to (re)open and support multiple horizons of  possibility. 
What, then, does critique mean for this hybrid critical practice of  phenomenology? 
While the following list is not comprehensive, it covers a range of  different meanings, some 
of  which are shared by classical phenomenology, and some by other critical methodologies. 
The most important point running through this discussion is that critique is more than just 
an analytical method for pointing out what is wrong or problematic; it is also a creative, 
generative practice of  experimenting with ways of  addressing what is wrong without 
assuming that it can simply be made “right,” but still aspiring to make it less wrong, less 
harmful, less oppressive. 
I. CRITIQUE AS THE ART OF QUESTIONING, MOVED BY CRISIS 
At the heart of  critique is a capacity and willingness to question what might otherwise seem 
unquestionable, whether because it appears true, necessary, and foundational, or because 
it seems too irrelevant, marginal, or inconsequential to warrant further inquiry. One might 
be moved to ask questions by idle curiosity, by a desire for systematic completeness, or by 
stubborn contrariness.4 But one might also be moved by a situation that demands one’s 
attention, whether because it disrupts one’s expectations or because the expectations that 
it normalizes are intolerable. Critical phenomenology is situational in this latter sense; it 
goes beyond the activity of  questioning, doubting, or becoming skeptical about something 
for its own sake. It is not the devil’s advocate. Critical phenomenology has skin in the 
game, which is not to say that it only springs up in times of  emergency, but rather that it is 
attuned to the relation between lived experience and the stuff of  life: the materiality of  the 
world from which we live, the relationships that support or undermine our flourishing, the 
4 By “idle” curiosity, I mean curiosity as a form of  voyeuristic entertainment, in contrast with the rich 
accounts of  curiosity by Perry Zurn (2021) and others for whom curiosity is very close to the sense of  
critical attention that I articulate here.
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infrastructure that distributes life chances equitably or inequitably.  
 In this sense, a critical practice of  phenomenology remains rooted in the ancient Greek 
sense of  kritikē tekhnē as the art of  making distinctions to address a legal or political conflict, 
and also the medieval Latin sense of  crisis as a medical situation calling for diagnosis and 
intervention.  As Wendy Brown (2005) explains, kritikē tekhnē involved “recognizing an 
objective crisis and convening subjective critics who then passed a critical judgment and 
provided a formula for restorative action” (5). For the ancient Greeks, the art of  critique 
was not only to clarify what is wrong in a situation, but also to undertake thought and action 
“to sort, sift, and set the times to rights” (6). In this sense, critique is not only a negative or 
analytical practice, it is also a (re)constructive intervention to “stave off catastrophe” and to 
find a path towards repair (7).
 Two points are especially important here for my account of  critical phenomenology: 
first, the situation of  being moved to think by a concrete situation or problem—a “crisis,” both 
in the sense of  a punctual, disruptive event and also in the sense of  ongoing, structural forms 
of  injustice or harm—and secondly, the orientation towards creative, reparative action, 
beyond the clarification and diagnosis of  problems. This practice of  situated, motivated, 
and creative questioning is more interested in responses and response-ability than in 
definitive answers or solutions. As such, its aim is not to put an issue to rest, but rather 
to (re)open horizons of  indeterminacy, possibility, and becoming-otherwise. This includes 
rigorous forms of  attention to joy and delight that immerse themselves in phenomena 
without needing to know whether or how this joy can be justified. 
II. CRITIQUE AS TRANSCENDENTAL INQUIRY
At the heart of  modern European philosophy, including classical phenomenology, is an 
understanding of  critique as a systematic inquiry to clarify concepts and to establish the 
limits of  these concepts and their application, in resistance to dogmatism. As Kant (2008) 
writes in the Critique of  Pure Reason: 
We deal with a concept dogmatically . . . if  we consider it as contained 
under another concept of  the object which constitutes a principle of  
reason and determine it in conformity with this. But we deal with it 
merely critically if  we consider it only in reference to our cognitive 
faculties and consequently to the subjective conditions of  thinking it, 
without undertaking to decide anything about its object. (243)
In this sense, critique involves a shift of  attention from the object to the subject, and from 
the empirical to the transcendental; it is a form of  transcendental inquiry that reflects on 
the (subjective) conditions for the possibility of  a thought or perception. 
 The phenomenological method developed by Edmund Husserl and refined by many 
others including Eugen Fink, Edith Stein, Maurice Halbwachs, and Alfred Schutz, is critical 
in this sense. The natural attitude is a site of  unquestioned, pre-reflective dogmatism that 
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must be bracketed through the epochē and led back to its transcendental conditions through 
a series of  reductions to discover, clarify, and systematize the underlying structures of  
intentionality that make possible the meaningful appearance of  a world to consciousness. 
As such, the phenomenological method cuts through the dogmatism of  psychologism, 
positivism, and abstract rationalism, opening up a middle path that is both theoretically 
systematic and also grounded in lived experience. This understanding of  critique is 
necessary but insufficient for critical phenomenology, as I hope will become clear in the 
sections that follow. 
III. CRITIQUE AS THE HISTORICALLY-GROUNDED, QUASI-TRANSCENDENTAL 
STUDY OF PARTICULAR LIFEWORLDS
In addition to a transcendental inquiry into the conditions for the possibility of  any world 
whatsoever, some phenomenologists have made historically-grounded inquiries into 
particular lifeworlds, as well as particular ways of  being situated in these lifeworlds. In 
The Crisis of  European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Husserl (1970) defines the 
lifeworld as the pre-given, pre-reflective context of  everyday experience that grounds the 
meaning of  basic concepts upon which empirical sciences rely, but which they cannot 
fully understand without the transcendental science of  phenomenology (121-48). Husserl 
acknowledges the importance of  history as “the vital movement of  the coexistence and the 
interweaving of  original formations and sedimentations of  meaning,” and he argues that 
the conclusions of  “factual history” remain naïve to the extent that they ignore “the general 
ground of  meaning upon which all such conclusions rest” and “the immense structural a 
priori which is proper to it” (371). This acknowledgement of  historicity opens the possibility 
of  a phenomenological study of  the historical a priori “which encompasses everything that 
exists as historical becoming and having-become or exists in its essential being as tradition 
and handing-down” (372). But the radical potential of  this account is abruptly limited by 
Husserl’s commitment to a teleological view of  history in which “all historical facticities, 
all historical surrounding worlds, peoples, times, civilizations” are ultimately whittled down 
to their essences in order to demonstrate, within the “aeterna veritas” of  phenomenology 
as a transcendental science, that “the same reason… functions in every man, the animal 
rationale, no matter how primitive [sic] he is” (377-78).
 A more promising approach to the historical a priori emerges in Michel Foucault’s 
account of  the contingent historical structures that nevertheless operate as a “grid” of  
intelligibility, shaping the production and circulation of  statements that function as a basis 
for truth claims. Foucault (1972) writes:
 
Juxtaposed, these two words [historical apriori] produce a rather 
startling effect; what I mean by the term is an a priori that is not 
a condition of  validity for judgements, but a condition of  reality 
for statements. It is not a question of  rediscovering what might 
legitimize an assertion, but of  freeing the conditions of  emergence 
of  statements, the law of  their coexistence with others, the specific 
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form of  their mode of  being, the principles according to which they 
survive, become transformed, and disappear. (127)
James Dodd (2016) explains the relation, but also the difference, between the historical a 
priori in Husserl and Foucault in terms of  the archive:
Foucault’s notion of  the archive can be thought of  as marking that 
gap or break of  separation that binds but at the same time holds us 
apart from the past, and in this sense its analysis shares something 
with what Husserl describes as the zigzag of  historical reflection. 
But here it is the break and not the continuity with the past, the 
manner in which past discursive practices are no longer ‘‘our own’’ 
as opposed to inescapably ours, that is revealed as the space in which 
the archive appears. (34)
This difference between Husserlian and Foucaultian approaches to the historical a priori is 
decisive for critical phenomenology.5 While classical phenomenology may aspire to become 
a science of  essences built on transcendental reflection and eidetic variation, critical 
phenomenology needs an archive. It is not just anyone’s reflection on anything, it is someone’s 
reflection on a particular situation that they did not create single-handedly, but in which 
they are implicated. Precisely because an historical situation is more complex than the first-
person experience of  any given consciousness, we need more than our own perspective 
to make sense of  it. Critical phenomenology moves beyond the centrality of  first-person 
experience in classical phenomenology, although it does not leave it behind; rather, it 
engages with third-person accounts and second-person encounters, both to broaden its 
understanding of  the situation and to deepen its sense of  the quasi-transcendental structures 
at work in its own first-person experience.  
 Individual introspection is not enough to pick out the quasi-transcendental historical 
structures that shape one’s own lived experience. In addition to the transcendental reduction 
that begins with a reduction to ownness, critical phenomenology needs a method of  what 
Sartre (2004) calls “regressive” analysis (39). This analysis may begin with first-person 
experience, but also takes its cue from an archive of  statements, events, and expressions that 
are not directly accessible in the first-person, but only through the mediation of  language, 
writing, images, documents, artifacts, and so forth. In studying this archive, the critical 
phenomenologist is not just studying “the world” as opposed to their “own” experience; 
5 Foucault’s own relation to phenomenology is notoriously hostile. In claiming that critical phenomenology 
needs an archive, I do not mean to imply that Foucault himself  was a secret phenomenologist, or even 
that he would approve of  the connections I am making between critical phenomenology and Foucault’s 
own methods of  archeology, genealogy, and problematization. My claim is not that these methods 
are actually phenomenological, but that a critical practice of  phenomenology needs to engage with 
critical methods beyond its own transcendental and eidetic methods. For a more detailed discussion of  
Foucault, phenomenology, and the historical a priori, see Koopman (2010, 2012) as well as the special 
issue of  Continental Philosophy Review on the Historical A Priori in Husserl and Foucault, edited by Andreea 
Smaranda Aldea and Amy Allen (2016).
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they are studying the world in which they exist as (historical) Being-in-the-world. In other 
words, they are studying the sedimented structures of  a situation that they inhabit, but 
which they cannot access through personal memory or perception alone. 
 This is precisely the form of  study that phenomenologists such as Simone de Beauvoir, 
Frantz Fanon, Sartre, and others undertake in their critical phenomenologies of  patriarchy, 
racism, colonialism, and capitalism.6 What makes these inquiries quasi-transcendental 
rather than empirical—although there is also a great deal of  empirical research in The 
Second Sex and other works—is the elaboration of  the phenomenological method not only 
to bracket the natural attitude and uncover apodictic transcendental structures, but also to 
bracket specific aspects of  the natural attitude—sexism, racism, colonialism, classism—to 
follow the traces of  these contingent, historical structures in the world, in the habits of  
embodied consciousness, and in the many correlations between them. 
 Already, we should note a certain complication of  some basic concepts of  phenomenology, 
such as Husserl’s repeated claim that the singular transcendental ego is prior to transcendental 
intersubjectivity, or his claim that consciousness constitutes the world without reciprocity. 
While a detailed discussion of  these issues is beyond the scope of  the current paper, I 
don’t think we can get a critical phenomenology off the ground without affirming that 
transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity are equiprimordial, and that the world—
not merely in the sense of  a material universe, but also in the phenomenological sense of  
the broadest possible horizon for meaning—shapes the habits of  embodied consciousness, 
even if  the meaning of  world as such is inconceivable without consciousness. 
 To elaborate this claim more concretely: a critical phenomenology of  patriarchy is 
still a phenomenological inquiry, even though patriarchy itself  is a contingent, historical 
phenomenon that manifests differently in different times and places, insofar as it attends 
both to patriarchal phenomena—i.e., to particular ways that patriarchy shows itself  in 
the world, for example in institutions, laws, literary and philosophical works, etc.—and 
to patriarchal forms of  consciousness, including patriarchal ways of  perceiving, feeling, 
imagining, acting, moving, and relating to others. One could conduct an ethnographic or 
auto-ethnographic study of  the subjective experience of  patriarchy that does not rise to 
the level of  critical phenomenology, even if  it does follow a “phenomenological” research 
method of  conducting interviews that ask participants to describe how they feel about x 
or how they experience x-y-z. What makes an inquiry critical phenomenology is, in my view, a 
quasi-transcendental analysis of  how such experiences are possible, how such a (life)world 
is possible—not just “what is it like” but also how it got this way, and what would it take to 
transform the situation. Foucault (1988) makes a similar point in a late interview: “A critique 
6 Martin Heidegger also attempted a disastrous, proto-fascist, and anti-Semitic critique of  a particular 
lifeworld, which he interpreted as the decadence of  European and American democracies. There is 
nothing in the first three senses of  critique to resist the violent appropriation of  intellectual traditions and 
philosophical methods to (re)inforce some forms of  dogmatism in the name of  defeating others. This is 
why we need a more robust sense of  the normative orientation of  critical phenomenology to distinguish 
between liberatory and oppressive practices. Such a critique begins—but does not end—with a close, 
careful inquiry into particular lifeworlds.
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is not a matter of  saying that things are not right as they are. It is a matter of  pointing out 
on what kinds of  assumptions, what kinds of  familiar, unchallenged, unconsidered modes 
of  thought the practices that we accept rest” (154-55, cited in Zigon 2018, 159). Foucault’s 
genealogical method is one way of  undertaking such a critique, which is distinct from 
phenomenology but not incompatible with it.7
 In order to undertake an historically-grounded, quasi-transcendental critique of  a 
particular lifeworld, one must grasp social structures like patriarchy or white supremacy 
as both constituted and constitutive: both constructed and upheld by particular relations of  
power, and also generative of  thoughts, perceptions, and actions that tend to naturalize 
and normalize those power relations. When we practice phenomenology in this way, we 
are still attentive to the correlations between consciousness and world, but we do not 
restrict ourselves to universal, apodictic correlations. How, then, do we develop appropriate 
methods for this kind of  work? For this, we must look beyond classical phenomenology 
without losing touch with it.
IV. CRITIQUE AS (SITUATED AND INTERESTED) ANALYSIS OF POWER
In addition to 1) the art of  asking questions in response to a crisis, 2) a transcendental 
inquiry into a priori conditions of  possibility, and 3) a quasi-transcendental study of  the 
historical a priori that shapes particular lifeworlds, there are many schools of  thought that 
practice critique as a study of  social power. We could call these approaches critical theory, 
without prioritizing the Frankfurt School or any other approach that designates itself  in this 
way. Critical theory identifies a form of  injustice, oppression, domination, exploitation, or 
extraction, and breaks it down, analyzing how it works. This is not generally understood 
as a transcendental or even quasi-transcendental inquiry; more often than not, it takes the 
form of  an historical materialist inquiry into the social and political conditions of  injustice 
in specific situations. 
 Iris Marion Young (2010) defines critical theory as “a normative reflection that 
is historically and socially contextualized. . . . Normative reflection must begin from 
historically specific circumstances because there is nothing but what is, the given, the situated 
interest in justice, from which to start” (5, emphasis added). This account of  critical theory 
resonates with the phenomenological commitment to beginning with the given, but it also 
contrasts sharply with Husserl’s insistence on the disinterestedness of  the phenomenologist 
(for example, in Husserl 2010, 110, 174-5, 241). Husserl’s approach to phenomenology 
includes an arguably normative reflection on the value of  freedom, but his understanding 
of  freedom is negative and methodological; it entails freedom from the sort of  interests that, 
in his view, would interfere with the methodological neutrality required for the project of  
constructing a universal science of  essences. The emerging field of  critical phenomenology 
7 See Oksala (2016) for an example of  scholarship that brings these methodologies together in productive 
ways.
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does not share these universalist aspirations, nor the teleological view of  history upon 
which they are founded. This does not mean that critical phenomenology is “biased,” or 
that it slips back into a dogmatic adherence to a specific set of  assumptions or principles. 
Critical phenomenology is committed to a sense of  freedom that is more substantive 
than methodological neutrality, but whose specific content or meaning remains open to 
indeterminate horizons of  possibility.  
To the extent that critique is situated or contextual, such that one is moved to think 
critically by a particular relation to the given and to a history in which one is implicated, 
critical phenomenology is a practice of  immanent critique. There is no outside to capitalism, 
heteropatriarchy, or colonialism from which to critique these structures and forces from a 
distance; rather, we must diagnose, resist, and unbuild them from within. As Karl Marx 
writes, “critique must comprehend itself  as a moment within the situation which it is seeking 
to supercede” (cited in Allen 2016, 43). The immanent character of  critique calls for the 
kind of  epistemic courage and humility that Amy Allen calls “openness to unlearning,” 
which is “properly understood not as a rejection of  the reflexivity afforded to us by the 
epistemic and normative resources of  modernity, but rather as a further elaboration of  
it” (31). This suggests that critique is not just a negative practice of  pointing out what is 
oppressive or wrong, but also an openness to transformation, where action is understood 
not as a post-critical application of  theory, but a further elaboration of critique. 
One might well ask: what does phenomenology bring to critical theory that is not already 
alive and well in other critical methods? In other words, why practice critical phenomenology 
when one could undertake critical theory in many other ways without having to deal with 
the transcendental baggage of  a tradition that has centred the first-person experience of  a 
putatively unmarked, de-contextualized, and de-historicized “consciousness”? Wouldn’t it 
be more critical just to leave phenomenology behind?
While I appreciate these questions and affirm a multiplicity of  different critical 
methodologies, I remain committed to critical phenomenology because it offers a rich and 
insightful method for paying rigorous attention to lived experience in relation to social 
structures and in the context of  an archive, without reducing the alterity, singularity, and 
complex relationality of  experience to these structures. Phenomenology’s affirmation of  
the inexhaustible horizons of  meaning in any given experience holds open the possibility 
of  unlearning and transforming sedimented habits of  thought and being. It anchors this 
possibility in the horizon, not just as a methodological assumption but as a transcendental 
structure shaped in particular ways by quasi-transcendental relations of  power. Building 
from this transcendental foundation, and (un)learning from other methodologies, critical 
phenomenology has grounds to claim that freedom is not just contingently preferable to 
oppression, it is an a priori good. But it also has the subtlety and complexity to explore the 
meaning of  freedom in different contexts and situations.
For example, Beauvoir’s (1964) critical phenomenology of  oppression shows that the 
meaning of  freedom is not limited to rights or capacities but rather unfolds in relation to 
time, understood in terms of  an indeterminate horizon of  possibility, the relation to an open 
future (60-61). Freedom is both an existential structure for Beauvoir and also a concrete 
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site of  political struggle. The existential concept of  freedom helps to resist overly reductive 
accounts of  oppression that would seem to foreclose any possibility of  resistance, given the 
relentlessness of  the structures and systems designed to curtail or destroy freedom. But the 
attention to particular situations where freedom and oppression are at stake, and where 
the antinomies of  action make it difficult or impossible to know the right thing to do, keep 
this transcendental orientation towards freedom grounded in the complexity of  situations 
where its specific meaning remains open to interpretation and experimentation. 
Other path-breaking examples of  critical phenomenology that engage in critique as 
a situated and interested analysis of  power include Young’s (1990) phenomenology of  
feminine embodiment, Lewis Gordon’s (2006) critique of  anti-Black racism as bad faith 
(1995), Sara Ahmed’s queer phenomenology, and Salamon’s (2010) phenomenology of  
trans embodiment.
V. CRITIQUE AS PROBLEMATIZATION 
Problematization is the practice of  articulating and questioning the assumptions that 
motivate one’s “situated interest in justice.” While this might not sound very different 
from the first sense of  critique as questioning, it’s important to distinguish between the 
art of  asking questions and the practice of  problematizing the very terms with which one 
formulates a question. Heidegger asked plenty of  questions, but he did not problematize his 
situation as a German in a fascist, anti-Semitic, white supremacist state.
 Problematization includes the critical disciplinary practice of  re-thinking one’s own key 
terms, for example by not taking for granted the meaning of  race in critical race studies, or 
not assuming the meaning of  disability in critical disability studies. Gayle Salamon (2018) 
writes that critical phenomenology:
reflects on the structural conditions of  its own emergence, and in 
this it is following an imperative that is both critical in its reflexivity 
and phenomenological in its taking-up of  the imperative to describe 
what it sees in order to see it anew. In this, what is critical about 
critical phenomenology turns out to have been there all along. (12)
 Similarly, anthropologist Cheryl Mattingly (2019) distinguishes between critical 
phenomenology 1.0, which she defines as applied phenomenology or “approaches that bring 
together critical sociopolitical voices and scholarly traditions with phenomenological ones” 
(416), and critical phenomenology 2.0, which she understands as “a radical provocation 
to disquiet dominant sociopolitical concepts, including those we ourselves hold” (417).8 In 
8 See also the work of  anthropologist Robert Desjarlais (2005), for whom critical phenomenology “attends 
at once to the concerns and lifeworlds of  [our ethnographic subjects] and to the interrelated social, 
discursive, and political forces that underpinned those concerns and lifeworlds” (369). For Desjarlais, 
critical phenomenology makes “a plea for experimentation and difference in future research into the 
subjective worlds of  those suffering from distress” (370).
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other words, critical phenomenology 2.0 problematizes its own basic concepts in a reflective 
(or maybe even hyper-reflective or meta-reflective) way, as a practice of  phenomenology 
that unfolds not merely alongside but through ethnography.9 
 In his later work, Foucault (1994a) defines problematization as a practice that: 
. . . develops the conditions in which possible responses can be 
given; it defines the elements that will constitute what the different 
solutions attempt to respond to. This development of  a given into a 
question, this transformation of  a group of  obstacles and difficulties 
into problems to which the diverse solutions will attempt to produce 
a response, this is what constitutes the point of  problematization and 
the specific work of  thought. (118)
Erinn Gilson (2014) clarifies: “Our response, then, is not to the problem as a dilemma 
but to the conditions of  its emergence, its problematic structure” (88). This point is key 
for any critical practice of  phenomenology, and it helps to clarify what is at stake in a 
quasi-transcendental study of  particular lifeworlds with a situated interest in power. For 
example, one could approach the problem of  mass incarceration as a dilemma to be solved 
through sentencing reform, legislative change, or even by releasing people from prison 
and eventually closing down prisons. But these ways of  “solving” the dilemma of  mass 
incarceration would not, in themselves, address the conditions of  the problem’s emergence, 
and they may actually exacerbate the problem by inscribing carceral logics more deeply, 
for example by expanding non-custodial forms of  surveillance and disciplinary control. 
In order to problematize mass incarceration, one must not only grasp how it is “wrong” 
and try to make it “right,” one must trace the contingent, yet constitutive structures that 
normalize the conflation of  accountability with punishment – and in order to do this, one 
must situate oneself  in relation to networks of  carceral power that promise security and 
prosperity to some, while exposing others to containment, control, and state violence.  
 In a sense, problematization is questioning 2.0; it has a reflexive structure that takes even 
its own most compelling responses as problems for further thought. As such, problematization 
opens endless horizons of  possibility, not in a way that stalls or forecloses action but for 
the sake of  resisting co-optation by hegemonic power. To continue the example of  mass 
incarceration, problematization allows us to grasp prison abolition not as the finite project of  
shutting down correctional institutions, but rather as an open ethical horizon of  possibility 
that seeks to dismantle the carceral, capitalist, colonial, patriarchal, white supremacist logics 
that form the prison state’s conditions of  emergence. In the words of  Fred Moten and Stefano 
Harney (2004), the point is “[n]ot so much the abolition of  prisons but the abolition of  a 
society that could have prisons” (114). 
9 Ultimately, the practice of  problematization must also extend to critique itself. For an abolitionist 
problematization of  critique, see Boggs et al (2019, 27-28).
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 Even though problematization is an open-ended process, it does not devolve into an 
endless reflection on the problem with solutions, which in turn become problems, and so 
on, and so on, ad infinitum. This is because problematization also does the creative or 
generative work of  assembling a community of  thought and action—an emergent “we”—
to respond to problems without assuming that a definitive solution is possible. Foucault 
(1994a) argues that it is
necessary to make the future formation of  a “we” possible by 
elaborating the question. Because it seems to me that the ‘we’ must 
not be previous to the question; it can only be the result—and the 
necessarily temporary result—of  the question as it is posed in the 
new terms in which one formulates it . . . [This is a matter of] seeing 
if  it were possible to establish a “we” on the basis of  the work that 
had been done, a “we” that would also be likely to form a community 
of  action. (114-15)
This invocation of  a community of  action brings us to the sixth and final sense of  critique 
as a praxis of  freedom.
VI. CRITIQUE AS A PRAXIS OF FREEDOM
This final sense of  critique is also the most important for critical phenomenology. I 
understand praxis not only in a general sense as the embodied and/or collective practices 
through which one makes sense of  the world, but also in a more specific sense rooted in 
community organizing as the relation between theory, action, and reflection that is explicitly 
oriented towards resistance, resurgence, emancipation, liberation, or some other way of  
trying to get (a little more) free.
 In the Theses on Feuerbach, Marx (1975) defines praxis as sinnlich-menschliche Tätigkeit or 
“sensuous human activity,” which Frederic Jameson interprets as “a material, or materialist, 
action involving change” (Sartre 2004, xix). Sartre builds on this Marxist account in his 
Critique of  Dialectical Reason, defining praxis as human activity that alters the material-
historical context in which it unfolds by producing structures with enough stability to 
constitute a new sense of  social and historical reality (53-64). Sartre calls this reality the 
practico-inert; it is the material-historical field out of  which praxis arises and which it seeks 
to perpetuate and/or transform (67, 71-74). Each configuration of  the practico-inert has 
its own sedimented objects, patterns and norms that limit and shape the possibilities for 
action without fully determining them (162-66). Part of  the work of  critique is to track the 
interplay of  praxis and the practico-inert, identifying counter-finalities that constrain or 
block the horizon of  possibility for further action (124, 183). 
 With this critical phenomenology of  praxis, Sartre (2004) reminds us that we make the road 
by walking: “Through experimentation, as through any other form of  activity, human action 
posits and imposes its own possibility” (19). While a Marxist critique begins with the means 
and modes of  production and pursues the contradictions internal to this material-historical 
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context, Sartre’s critical phenomenology “set[s] out from the immediate, that is to say from 
the individual fulfilling himself  in his abstract praxis, so as to rediscover, through deeper 
and deeper conditionings . . . historical man” (52). In other words, critique unfolds as an 
investigation of  the historical depth and texture and structure of  my own experience, which 
becomes accessible to me through a regressive investigation of  leading-back to the material 
conditions of  this experience, but also (ultimately) also a progressive movement of  cultivating 
new forms of  praxis. For Sartre, praxis is not just the creation of  a new and unanticipated 
future through a critical engagement with the past; it is also “a movement from the future 
(for example, the machine in working order) towards the past: repairing something means 
grasping its integrity both as a temporal abstract and as the future state which is to be 
reconstituted” (61). In this sense, critical praxis is not just an analytical process of  pointing 
out, breaking down, and clarifying what is dogmatic, unjust, or problematic, but also a 
creative practice of  (re)claiming, (re)building and experimenting with alternative ways of  
Being-in-the-world and Being-with others, supported by more life-giving frameworks for 
thought, action, and existence. 
 This creative or generative work of  critique ranges from the relatively modest goal 
of  cultivating “the art of  not being governed quite so much,” as Foucault (2001) defines 
critique in his later work (193), to a radical “restructuring of  the world,” as Fanon (1986) 
announces in Black Skin, White Masks (60). Restructuring the world is not a metaphor; 
it is a revolutionary practice with material conditions and effects. But revolutions don’t 
happen unless people also come to perceive, remember, and imagine the world differently. 
In his essay, “This is the Voice of  Algeria,” Fanon (1965) shows how a sense of  national 
consciousness emerged among people in remote villages who gathered around radios to 
listen through static and signal disruptions to Radio Free Algeria, collectively interpreting 
the meaning of  broadcasts from the front and holding open the possibility of  another 
world beyond colonial domination. This collective act of  problematizing and interpreting 
colonial power “brings about essential mutations in the consciousness of  the colonized, 
in the manner in which he perceives the colonizer, in his human status in the world” (53). 
But it also has material effects: “Listening in on the Revolution, the Algerian existed with 
it, made it exist” (93, emphasis added). In an extraordinary turn of  phrase, Fanon calls 
this “a radical transformation of  the means of  perception, of  the very world of  perception” 
(96, emphasis added). Revolutionary praxis must not only seize control of  the means of  
production, but also transform the means of  perception that (re)produces meaning in and 
through materiality. 
 The desire to restructure the world might sound naïve or utopian if  we limit our 
revolutionary imagination to a sudden, instantaneous change on a planetary scale. But 
if  we understand the meaning of  world phenomenologically, as an open-ended context 
for meaningful experience with nested levels of  intimacy and strangeness that sometimes 
overlap and sometimes conflict or crash against each other, then we must admit that the 
structure of  the world is quite open to change – sometimes frighteningly so. The collective 
practice of  restructuring the world need not extend to a global scale in order to matter. It 
might turn on very basic questions like, “Can I live?” (Hartman 2019, 10). What would it 
take to get your knee off his throat? How can we help each other breathe? 
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 As a generative context for meaning and for happening, world is both an epistemic and 
an ontological concept. It is not an entity or a collection of  entities; it is also not a container 
for entities. Rather, world is a matrix of  relations and a horizon of  possibilities. In his 
critical hermeneutics of  worldbuilding, Jarrett Zigon (2018) understands political action 
as a practice of  “moving into the clearings—the sites of  potentialities—that emerge in the 
interstices of  [for example] the drug war situation. Once there, in the clearings, we can 
begin to experiment with new political-moral concepts that may hold up to the burden of  
a worldly political demand” (101). For Zigon, “[a] critical hermeneutics cannot simply tear 
down and destroy; it cannot simply unground. It must also create by disclosing the openings 
that are already there” (159). He calls this “a critical hermeneutics of  what can be as a 
practice of  the not-yet” (160) and “an ethics for becoming otherwise” (161). Like the open-
ended processes of  problematization, praxis is not necessarily—perhaps not ever—a matter 
of  finding “solutions,” but rather of  (re)opening, expanding, and amplifying horizons of  
possibility that might have otherwise seemed closed or nonexistent. 
COMMON THREADS
At the heart of  these different senses of  critique is the (re)opening of  a possibility for moving 
beyond the situation as it currently presents itself: a movement that is provoked by crisis, or 
by a situation that raises questions for thought and action. 
 The first three senses of  critique—the art of  asking questions, the transcendental inquiry 
into conditions of  possibility for meaningful experience, and the quasi-transcendental study 
of  historical conditions of  experience—tend to be regressive in their analysis, insofar they 
seek to reconstruct the conditions and structures that have produced the current situation. 
The final three senses of  critique—the analysis of  power, problematization, and the praxis 
of  freedom – are progressive or transformative insofar as they seek to intervene in the 
current situation, and not just understand how it came to be.10  The sixth sense of  critique 
as praxis reminds us that it is not enough to be aware of  oppression or to understand how 
it works, we must also figure out how to change it by (re)opening concrete possibilities for 
survival, escape, healing, and restructuring the world. In this sense, critique is a creative 
practice—which does not mean that it produces substantive principles that form the basis 
of  a new dogmatism. The fifth sense of  critique as problematization still applies here, 
but praxis urges us to move beyond the identification of  problems, and even beyond the 
assembling of  a critical sense of  “we,” by actively experimenting with collective practices 
of  freedom. If  the fourth sense of  critique as an analysis of  injustice tells us about the 
conditions under which current world was built—namely, through slavery, colonialism, 
capitalism, and heteropatriarchy—then the sixth sense of  critique as praxis challenges us to 
study, reclaim, imagine, and (re)build alternative ways of  being and becoming in relation. 
10 This language of  regressive and progressive analysis comes from Sartre’s (2004) Critique of  Dialectical 
Reason.
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 One might wonder if  critical phenomenology still has need of  transcendental critique if  
it is committed to an historically-grounded, situated analysis of  particular lifeworlds with a 
normative orientation towards practices of  freedom. I believe we do need a transcendental 
argument for the normative orientation towards freedom, even—or especially—if  the meaning 
of  freedom remains open and indeterminate. One might also wonder if  critical theory has 
much need for phenomenology if  so many of  the methods that make phenomenology 
critical come from other intellectual and political traditions. For me, what phenomenology 
has to offer critical theory is a rigorous practice of  attention to that which escapes coherent 
understanding or explanation: attention to alterity, singularity, and the irreducibility of  
lived lives to the patterns and structures that shape them and the context with which they 
grapple—even in the midst of  this shaping and grappling. 
 What might a critical phenomenology of  experience, improvisation, and experimentation 
become if  we affirmed a methodological hybridity rather than policing the boundaries 
of  what counts as phenomenology? I will leave the last word to Ocean Vuong (2017), 
who reworks a phenomenological account of  attention, deepening its critical and ethical 
significance:
Simone Weil says, “Attention is the rarest and purest form of  
generosity.” That’s my mantra to myself: Pay attention to people, 
what they care about, their worlds, their words, their aesthetics, their 
life. I look at Simone Weil and say, “Why don’t we edit that?” What 
if  we were so ambitious—to change the word “rarest” to “most 
common?” What would we then say? “Attention is the most common 
and purest form of  generosity.” That’s what I’m working toward. 
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